

CRYPTO 101: REAL-WORLD DEPLOYMENTS

2. PUBLIC-KEY INFRASTRUCTURES (PKI)


Alfred Menezes
cryptography101.ca

Outline


1. Key management
2. Methods for distributing public keys
3. Components of a PKI
4. Certification authorities (CAs)
5. Certificates
6. The certification process
7. Certificate revocation
8. CA trust models
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Key management


- ♦ **Key management** is a set of techniques and procedures supporting the creation, distribution, storage, and updating of cryptographic keys.
- ♦ *In this video, we'll consider the management of **public keys** that are used for public-key encryption (e.g. RSA encryption), key agreement (e.g., ECDH), and signature verification (e.g., RSA and ECDSA).*



Example: Secure channels



Example: Software updates



Three other examples

♦ FIDO2: Fast IDentity Online



fidoalliance.org

- ♦ *Reduce the world's reliance on passwords to better secure the web.*
- ♦ Alice generates a key pair for ECDSA, and registers her public key with a website.
- ♦ When Alice later logs into the web site, she uses her private key to sign a random challenge issued by the website.
- ♦ The server verifies the signature using Alice's public key.

♦ ePassports (ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization)

- ♦ Alice's ePassport contains a document signed by a Document Signer, that in turn is certified by a Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA).
- ♦ International border authorities verify the signed document.



♦ Apple's mandatory code signing: Approved app developers must sign their code.

- ♦ See tinyurl.com/AppleAppSigning

Methods for distributing public keys

1. Point-to-point delivery over a trusted channel.
 - ♦ Trusted courier.
 - ♦ One-time user registration.
 - ♦ Visual inspection.
2. Direct access to a trusted file.
3. Use of an on-line trusted server.
4. Off-line certification authority (CA).
 - ♦ Public keys are transported in certificates, issued by a certification authority.



Public-key infrastructures (PKI)


- ♦ **Certificate:** A public-key *certificate* is a (digital) document generated by a Certification Authority. The document cryptographically binds together an entity's identity to its public key (and other attributes) in a manner that allows other entities to gain trust in the public key's authenticity.
- ♦ **PKI:** A comprehensive framework that combines cryptographic protocols, technology, policies and supporting services (legal, business, etc.), to ensure the secure and reliable use of public-key certificates.

Components of a PKI

1. Certificate format.
2. Certification Authority (CA).
3. The certification process.
4. Certificate revocation.
5. Trust models.
6. Certificate policy:
Details of the intended use and scope of a particular certificate.
7. Certification practice statement (CPS):
Practices and policies followed by a CA.

Certificate format

♦ X.509 certificate format



Certification Authorities (CAs)

- ♦ A CA issues certificates that bind an entity's identity A and its public key.
- ♦ A 's **certificate** Cert_A consists of:
 1. **Data part** D_A : A 's identifier, her public key, and other information such as validity period.
 2. **Signature part** Sign_{CA} : The CA's signature on the data part.
- ♦ B obtains an authentic copy of A 's public key as follows:
 3. Obtain an authentic copy of the CA's public key Pub_{CA} .
 4. Obtain Cert_A (perhaps over an unsecured channel).
 5. Verify the CA's signature Sign_{CA} on D_A using Pub_{CA} .

Note: The CA does not have to be trusted with users' private keys.

Note: The CA has to be trusted to not create fraudulent certificates.



The certification process (1)

1. **CA key generation:** The CA's signature key pair is generated.
 - a) Security of the CA's private key is paramount.
 - b) Ideally, the private key is generated in a *Hardware Security Module* (HSM), and never leaves the HSM.
 - c) Ideally, several copies of the private key (or shares of the private key) are stored in HSMs in different geographical locations.
2. **Certificate request:** An entity A requests a certificate for their public key.
 - a) The request should be authenticated.
 - b) It may be necessary for the CA to maintain a record of the request.



The certification process (2)

3. **Identity verification:** The CA verifies A 's identity.

- a) This might be delegated to a *Registration Authority* (RA) or an *Intermediate CA*.
- b) The RA generates *registration certificates* and forwards to the CA for certificate issuance.

4. **Key validation:**

- a) The CA (or RA) verifies that A 's public key is valid (i.e., a private key logical exists).
- b) A proves possession of the corresponding private key.

5. **Certificate issuance:**

- a) The CA produces A 's certificate.
- b) The CA should require notification that A has accepted.

Certificate revocation

- ♦ A CA may wish to **revoke** (i.e. invalidate) a certificate before its expiry date.
- ♦ Reasons for certificate revocation include:
 - ♦ Private key compromise.
 - ♦ Owner leaves an organization.
 - ♦ Owner changes roles within an organization
- ♦ An entity who relies on a certificate needs to verify that the certificate has not been revoked.
- ♦ Three methods for informing relying parties about revoked certificates are:
 - ♦ Short-lived certificates.
 - ♦ Online certificate status checking.
 - ♦ Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).




The **Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)** is an [Internet protocol](#) used for obtaining the [revocation status](#) of an [X.509 digital certificate](#).^[2] It is described in RFC 6960 and is on the [Internet standards](#) track.

Certificate revocation lists (CRLs)




- ♦ A CRL is a list of certificates that have been revoked before their scheduled expiration dates.
- ♦ The CRL is issued and signed by a CA, and updated at regular intervals.
- ♦ An entity checks that a certificate is not included in the latest CRL before relying on that certificate.
- ♦ CRLs can be challenging to manage in large-scale PKI deployments:
 - ♦ Time granularity (time between revocation and CRL update).
 - ♦ CRL may become too large.

CA trust model: Single CA




- ♦ Example: Code signing in a software company.
 - ♦ **CA**: Apple.
 - ♦ **Endusers** A_i : App developers.
 - ♦ See tinyurl.com/AppleAppSigning

CA trust model: Single-root hierarchical CA



- ♦ The **root CA** issues certificates to **intermediate CAs**.
- ♦ Intermediate CAs issue certificates to **endusers**.
- ♦ Reasons for using intermediate CAs include:
 - ♦ distributing workload, reduce risk, separation by function, ...
- ♦ **Certificate chains**: To obtain an authentic copy of A_2 's public key, one needs A_2 's certificate, ICA_1 's certificate, and an authentic copy of the root CA's public key.
 - ♦ Use the root CA's public key to verify ICA_1 's certificate, thus verifying the authenticity of ICA_1 's public key.
 - ♦ Use ICA_1 's public key to verify A_2 's certificate, thus verifying the authenticity of A_2 's public key.


CA trust model: Multi-root hierarchical CA



Example: ePassports PKI



icao.int/Security/FAL/PKD/Pages



- ♦ Each participating country maintains a two-level single-root hierarchical PKI.
- ♦ The CSCA issues certificates for Document Signers.
- ♦ The DS signs the biographical information in an ePassport. The ePassport stores this signed document, and also the DS's certificate.
- ♦ To verify an ePassport, one needs the CSCA public key.
- ♦ CSCA public keys are distributed via a Public Key Directory (PKD).

PKI challenges

Although conceptually very simple, there are many challenges with deploying PKI on a large scale.

Many of the challenges arise from business, legal, and usability considerations. These challenges include:

- ♦ Interoperability: alleviated by standardized and certificate formats.
- ♦ Certificate revocation (CRLs).
- ♦ Secure generation and use of private signing keys: use HSMs.
- ♦ Business and legal issues, including cross-certification and liability.
- ♦ Migration to quantum-safe cryptography.